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Abstract
Audio is an important medium in people’s daily life, hidden
information can be embedded into audio for covert commu-
nication. Current audio information hiding techniques can
be roughly classed into time domain-based and transform
domain-based techniques. Time domain-based techniques
have large hiding capacity but low imperceptibility. Trans-
form domain-based techniques have better imperceptibility,
but the hiding capacity is poor. This paper proposes a new
audio information hiding technique which shows high hid-
ing capacity and good imperceptibility. The proposed audio
information hiding method takes the original audio signal
as input and obtains the audio signal embedded with hidden
information (called stego audio) through the training of our
private automatic speech recognition (ASR) model. Without
knowing the internal parameters and structure of the private
model, the hidden information can be extracted by the private
model but cannot be extracted by public models. We use four
other ASR models to extract the hidden information on the
stego audios to evaluate the security of the private model. The
experimental results show that the proposed audio informa-
tion hiding technique has a high hiding capacity of 48 cps
with good imperceptibility and high security. In addition, our
proposed adversarial audio can be used to activate an intrinsic
backdoor of DNN-based ASR models, which brings a serious
threat to intelligent speakers.
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of communication-related tech-
nologies, multimedia information such as image, audio, and
video is generated in large quantities and brings great conve-
nience to people. However, multimedia information services
pose a potential threat to the legitimate rights of the infor-
mation owner. As a different technology from traditional
cryptography, information hiding techniques [3] that use the
human’s perceptual redundancy for digital signals and hide
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the secret information into the carrier to provide technical
protection for the rights of multimedia information.
Since human auditory systems are more sensitive than vi-
sual systems, embedding secret information into audio media
is more challenging than images. In addition, as an important
medium in people’s daily life communication, the audio has
a good imperceptibility in the transmission of information
and provides a lot of redundant space for embedding hidden
information, making the research of audio information hiding
techniques more valuable.
Traditional audio information hiding techniques can be
roughly divided into two classes: time domain-based and
transform domain-based techniques.
Time domain technique directly embeds the hidden in-
formation into the carrier signal in the time domain. It has
large hiding capacity and easy to implement. However, di-
rectly modifying the carrier signal in the hiding process will
inevitably cause distortion of the carrier signal, which will
increase the difficulty of extracting the hidden information
and make the imperceptibility be poor. The commonly used
time domain-based techniques include the least significant
bit (LSB) [8, 19], echo hiding [15, 33] and spread spectrum
[32, 35] techniques.
Transform domain technique is to make the information
hidden in the carrier’s transform domain. It maps the carrier
information to the transform domain and modifies some pa-
rameters in the transform domain to hide information, which
can better resist the attack based on the various signal process-
ing while maintaining the imperceptibility. However, mapping
the audio signal to the transform domain requires a large num-
ber of signal processing operations, which results in high com-
putation complexity. At the same time, the strong robustness
is at the cost of reducing the hiding capacity. Therefore, the
hiding capacity of transform domain technique is small. Com-
monly used transform domain-based techniques include phase
coding [24, 25], discrete cosine transform (DCT) [20, 36] and
discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [4, 7] techniques.
In order to improve the hiding capacity and imperceptibil-
ity, this paper proposes to embed the hidden information to
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the audio signal by the private ASR model based on deep
neural network (DNN) on the transmitting end and extract the
hidden information by the private ASR model at the receiving
end. We also perform several performance tests on the gener-
ated stego audios. Experiment results show that our proposed
information hiding technique has good hiding capacity, im-
perceptibility and security. The contributions of this paper are
as follows.
• Novel hiding approach. We propose a new audio in-
formation hiding technique based on the adversarial
perturbations, which embeds and extracts the hidden
information by the DNN-based ASR model.
• High hiding capacity. The proposed technique embeds
the hidden information in the form of a whole sentence
with a hiding capacity of 48 character per second (cps).
• Well imperceptibility. The value of perceptual evalua-
tion of speech quality (PESQ) is 3.598 on average. Peo-
ple can barely perceive the perturbation.
• High security. Four public models such as Google and
IBM commercial ASR system are used to test the stego
audio signals and experimental results show that these
models are unable to extract the hidden information.
• A new backdoor. The hidden information can be used
as the specific trigger instruction to activate the model-
intrinsic backdoor for DNN-based speech recognition
models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces related works of traditional audio informa-
tion hiding techniques. Section 3 indicates the preliminary
knowledge. The proposed method and its working mecha-
nisms are elaborated in Section 4. The experimental results
are reported in Section 5. Section 6 demonstrates the applica-
tion of our method and the intrinsic backdoor of DNN-based
ASR models. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Works
The audio information hiding methods are mainly classed
into time domain-based and transform domain-based meth-
ods. The time domain-based methods are characterized by low
computation complexity and high hiding capacity, but poor
robustness and imperceptibility. The transform domain-based
methods usually have better robustness and imperceptibility,
but the computation complexity is high and the hiding capac-
ity is small. Several commonly used time domain-based and
transform domain-based methods are introduced below.
2.1 Time Domain-based Methods
2.1.1 Least Significant Bit (LSB) Method
In the embedding phase, the LSB method replaces the least
significant bits with the data bits of the hidden information.
In the extraction phase, as long as the corresponding least sig-
nificant bits are taken out, the embedded hidden information
can be recovered. Dieu et al. [8] proposed an improved LSB
method that is less sensible than the traditional LSB method,
but it is at the cost of reducing the hiding capacity, and it is not
robust. Jadhav et al. [19] proposed an enhanced security au-
dio information hiding technique that uses the top three most
significant bits (MSBs) to determine the least significant bit
(LSB) position of the hidden information. For example, when
the top three bits are "100", the hidden information bit will
be embedded in the 4th least significant bit. However, it still
cannot solve the problem of poor robustness while improving
security.
2.1.2 Echo Hiding Method
According to the auditory characteristics of human ear, if the
weak signal appears in a short time (usually 0-200ms) after a
strong signal in an audio, the weak signal will become inaudi-
ble. Echo hiding achieves the purpose of hiding information
by introducing echoes into discrete audio signals, and vari-
ous information can be represented by different echo delays.
Xiang et al. [33] proposed a technique for embedding audio
watermarks using echo hiding. The robustness and imper-
ceptibility have been improved over previous work, but the
hiding capacity has not been tested. Hua et al. [15] proposed
an audio watermarking scheme based on time-expanded echo.
It uses the finite impulse response (FIR) filter based on con-
vex optimization to obtain the optimal echo filter coefficients.
This scheme improves the imperceptibility and robustness
compared to the previous methods, but the hiding capacity
has not been tested.
2.2 Transform Domain-based Methods
2.2.1 DCT Domain Embedding Method
DCT-based method obtains the DCT coefficients after DCT
transform processing first, and then modifies the DCT coeffi-
cient for different positions to embed the hidden information
into the audio. Finally, after the inverse discrete cosine trans-
form operation, the stego audio signal is obtained. Zong et
al. [36] introduced an information hiding algorithm based
on the energy difference between frequency bands. By cal-
culating the difference between the energy average and the
energy variation, the hidden information is embedded into the
low frequency part of the DCT coefficients. The robustness is
better. However, the calculation coefficients are too many and
complicated and it is difficult to guarantee the correct rate of
hidden information extraction. Jeyhoon et al. [20] performed
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a DCT transform on each frame of the original audio signal
and then selected the appropriate DCT coefficient band to
embed the hidden information bits. The hiding capacity and
robustness of this method are good, but the imperceptibility
is slightly poor.
2.2.2 DWT Domain Embedding Method
Discrete wavelet transform (DWT) is a multi-scale multi-
resolution technique that decomposes signals into different
time-frequency components. Wavelet decomposition has a
good match with the human ear’s perceptual mental model.
The difference between DWT-based and DCT-based method
is that DWT modifies the DWT coefficient to embed the
hidden information into the audio. Das et al. [7] proposed a
method that hides both the hidden information and the key
in the DWT coefficients. However, the paper did not test the
hiding capacity and robustness of the stego audio. Avci et
al. [4] proposed a method by using the LSB method in the
DWT domain. It has a good imperceptibility, but the hiding
capacity is not high enough and no robustness experiments
are performed.
A good information hiding algorithm should guarantee a
large capacity with a good imperceptibility. However, the
two indicators are usually contradictory. The large hiding
capacity means that there is more hidden information can be
embedded in the carrier audio. It will decrease the quality of
the carrier audio, affect the imperceptibility, and increase the
risk of being cracked. In this paper, we propose a new audio
information hiding technique to balance imperceptibility and
hiding capacity.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Automatic Speech Recognition
Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) [12] is a cross-
disciplinary applied research that transforms speech signals
into corresponding texts through a process of recognition and
understanding. Nowadays, speech recognition technology has
been widely used in mobile devices, in-vehicle devices, robots
and other scenes, and has played an increasingly important
role in many fields such as search, manipulation, navigation,
entertainment and so on.
Early speech recognition techniques are based on sig-
nal processing and pattern recognition methods. With the
advancement of technology, machine learning methods are
increasingly applied to speech recognition research, espe-
cially deep learning technology, which has brought profound
changes to speech recognition research.
The structure of DeepSpeech [14] that we use is shown in
Fig. 1, which is an open source ASR engine based on Baidu’s
deep speech research. The model is trained in deep learning
techniques, which consists of five hidden layers ht(1)t -ht
(5)
t .
Figure 1: The structure of DeepSpeech [14].
The bidirectional recurrent neural network (BiRNN) in the
4-th layer is the core of DeepSpeech and the loss function
CTC-loss [13] is used to train the neural network.
3.2 Adversarial Examples
Deep learning, especially neural networks, has shown great ad-
vantages in the fields of image recognition, speech processing,
autonomous driving and medical diagnosis. In particular, the
recognition ability of image recognition models has exceeded
the accuracy of human eye. However, recent researches have
shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial
examples [29]. Adversarial example is carefully designed by
attackers to fool deep learning models. The difference be-
tween the adversarial examples and real examples is almost
indistinguishable by the human eye, but it can cause the model
to be misclassified.
The majority of adversarial example researches focused on
generating adversarial examples against image recognition
models [5,9,21,22,26,29]. Szegedy et al. [29] proposed an L-
BFGS method that uses L2 distance norm square to constrain
the perturbation to construct an image adversarial example.
Although this method is stable and effective, the calculation
is too complicated. Goodfellow et al. [9] added perturbations
in the gradient direction causing the model to misclassify the
resulting images. It is the simplest and fastest way to construct
an adversarial example, called the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM). However, as only one calculation is performed, the
size of the perturbation cannot be well controlled. Carlini and
Wagner [5] proposed an improved L-BFGS method, which is
currently the most powerful attack method, called CW attack.
It can perform targeted or non-targeted attacks effectively to
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Figure 2: The process of embedding the hidden information into audio signals.
misclassify the image recognition models.
However, recent researches have shown that speech recog-
nition models are also vulnerable to adversarial examples
[6, 18, 30]. Iter et al. [18] proposed to use FGSM [9] to gen-
erate audio adversarial examples, which can misclassify the
recognition result of the ASR system. However, the generated
adversarial examples have loud noises through the human ear
with a large distortion. Carlini et al. [6] proposed a method
for generating audio adversarial examples against a white-box
speech recognition model. It can produce very strong audio
adversarial examples, resulting in a misclassification rate of
up to 100%. Taori et al. [30] combined genetic algorithm and
gradient estimation targeted audio adversarial examples for
black box ASR model. However, it can only generate a phrase
consisting of two words with an attack success rate of only
35%.
The vulnerability to adversarial examples threatens the
security of DNN-based ASR models. However, we find an
interesting characteristic that audio adversarial examples gen-
erated by the current generating methods have no transfer-
ability, that is, the audio adversarial examples generated by a
specific model are not aggressive to other models. Therefore,
we introduce this characteristic into the field of audio infor-
mation hiding and use the deep learning model to generate
audio adversarial examples to embed the hidden information.
4 The Proposed Method
The paper proposes a new technique based on the adversarial
examples for audio information hiding, which embeds and
extracts the hidden information by the private DNN-based
ASR model. The technique is described in detail below. The
proposed intrinsic backdoor of DNN-based model will be
introduced in Section 6.
4.1 Embedding Method
The ASR model DeepSpeech acts as a private model owned
only by the send end and the receive end, which functions like
the grey box of embedding process in Fig. 6 in the traditional
information hiding method. The key idea is to take the original
audio signal and hidden text as the input and obtain the stego
audio signal after training the private model. For example,
input an audio signal that is “Good morning” into the private
model, and through training the model, the result of private
model is finally recognized as “hi, Siri”.
The process is shown in Fig. 2. First, input the original
audio signal X and the hidden text t into the ASR model.
In training phase, the slight perturbation δ that needs to be
added to the X is constantly updated according to the result
of the loss function. Finally, the generated stego audio signal
X + δ can be recognized as the hidden text t with a small
perturbation δ.
In order to recognize the audio as the hidden information,
the CTC-loss is selected as the loss function of our method,
which can output a probability for any text given an audio
signal. The detail principle of CTC-loss can be found in [13].
Thus the stego audio can be trained using the CTC-loss to
maximize the probability of the audio to be recognized as the
hidden text.
In the meantime, under the premise that the audio is recog-
nized as hidden text, the perturbation δ added to the original
audio should be quieter than the original audio signal X, hence
its value should be smaller than the original one. To make
a lower computational complexity, the L infinite norm ‖δ‖∞
(Eq. (1)) is used to represent the magnitude of perturbation.
‖δ‖∞ = max
1≤i≤n
|δi|. (1)
Converting the overall goal into an optimization problem
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is to minimize the ‖δ‖∞ in the case where the model C(·)
recognizes the speech (X+δ) as the target text t (i.e., C(X +
δ) = t), that is,
min ‖δ‖∞
s.t.C(X+δ) = t.
(2)
Since the constraintC(X+δ) = t is non-linear, the gradient
descent cannot be used to determine the convergence point
of ‖δ‖∞. The constraint can be converted to minimizing the
loss function l(X+δ, t), where the loss function l(·) is CTC
loss and l(X+δ, t) indicates the magnitude of the CTC loss
between the recognition result of X+δ and the target text t.
Therefore, the optimization problem becomes two minimize
problems. The formula is Eq. (3):
min ‖δ‖∞ & min l(X+δ, t). (3)
Hence how to combine the two constraints needs to be
considered. For facilitating the application of the gradient
optimizer, we separate them into two steps that keep iterating.
1. Calculate the δ that meets the condition of C(X+δ) = t
by applying gradient descent optimization to the loss
function l(X+δ, t);
2. Reduce the range of δ and clip it into the range.
The two steps keep iterating until reaching the set threshold
of iteration times. For the step 1, the gradient optimization
of δ is performed by using Adam Optimizer to make the
recognition result of X+δ close to the target text t gradually.
For the step 2, a threshold τ is set for δ to ensure the maximum
fluctuation range of δ will not exceed the threshold. The two
steps can be integrated to an iterative function Eq. (4):
{
δ0 = 0, X0 = X+δ0
δN+1 = clipδ,τ(∇δl(XN , t)), XN+1 = X+δN+1
(4)
The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The func-
tion clip(δ,−τ,τ) sets the values of δ smaller than τ become
τ, and values larger than −τ become −τ. As shown in Algo-
rithm 1, the determination of the threshold τ is shown in 10
- 18th rows. First, a large value of τ is given. Then after ob-
taining the minimized result δ, the value of τ is reduced. The
minimization process is repeated until reaching the number of
iterations we set. Finally, the last best result will be returned.
4.2 Extracting Method
Compared with traditional audio information hiding methods,
our proposed method does not need to use any complicated al-
gorithm to process the stego audio signal. As shown in Fig. 3,
the hidden text can be obtained by simply inputting the stego
audio signal into the private ASR model to recognize. In order
to ensure that other public ASR models cannot identify the
Algorithm 1 Information Embedding Algorithm
Input: Original audio signal X , Hidden text t
Output: Stego audio signal X ′
1: Initialize: δ−an initial zero array with the same shape of
X , τ−the threshold of δ, N−the max iteration times
2: X ′ = X+δ
3: for i= 0,1,2, . . . ,N do
4: //Calculate the loss
5: L= l(X ′, t)
6: //Update δ
7: δ←AdamOptimizer.minimize(L,δ)
8: δ= clip(δ,−τ,τ)
9: X ′ = X+δ
10: if C(X ′) == t then
11: //Update the threshold τ
12: if max(δ)≤ τ then
13: τ= max(δ)
14: end if
15: τ= 0.8 · τ
16: //Save the last best result
17: temp= X ′
18: end if
19: end for
20: return temp
hidden text, four state-of-art ASR models are used to extract
the hidden text from the stego audios. The experimental re-
sults show that in addition to the private ASR model, all other
public models cannot get any content related to the hidden
text, the test results can be seen in Section 5.3.
4.3 Backdoors
Backdoors are typically activated under very specific con-
ditions, which makes them unlikely to be activated and de-
tected using random trigger inputs. This paper proposes to
use the adversarial audio as the trigger input of DNN’s intrin-
sic backdoor which is intrinsic for any DNN-based speech
recognition models and not deliberately designed by the man-
ufacturer. The intrinsic backdoor will be introduced in detail
in Section 6.
5 Experiments and Results
Although the requirements for information hiding are dif-
ferent in various scenarios, hiding capacity, imperceptibility,
security and robustness are the main performance indicators
of audio information hiding techniques [27, 28]. In addition,
we perform a steganalysis to measure the probability of stego
audio being discovered.
In order to test the performance of the proposed audio
information hiding technique, 100 test audios (A00 - A99) are
selected from the Mozilla common voice dataset [23], which
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Figure 3: The process of extracting the hidden information from stego audio signals.
Table 1: The specific hidden information in different groups.
Group Audio Range Hidden Information
G1 A00-A09 be quiet
G2 A10-A19 sing louder
G3 A20-A29 close the door
G4 A30-A39 the key is one one nine
G5 A40-A49 call the police
G6 A50-A59 happy birthday to you
G7 A60-A69 be careful
G8 A70-A79 bob is the spy
G9 A80-A89 help me
G10 A90-A99 see you at five pm
are wav files with a length of 3 seconds, sampled at the rate
of 16 kHz and quantized with 16 bits, to embed the hidden
information. We divide these audios into 10 groups G1-G10.
The specific information to be hidden in different groups
is shown in Table 1. The stego audios are generated with
tensorflow and DeepSpeech v0.1.0 version, and the evaluation
indicators are obtained with MATLAB. The initial parameters
we set in the experiments are as follows. The iteration times
N is 500, the initial δ is an array of 0 with the same shape of
the audio signal, and the initial τ is set to 3000.
The performance of our method is compared with a spread
spectrum-based audio information hiding method [32]. It ob-
tains the DCT coefficients of audio first, then embeds the
hidden information into the coefficients by using a group of
orthonormal PN sequences. We have implemented this audio
information hiding method in MATLAB using the original
configuration in the [32]. The hiding capacity and impercepti-
bility are compared in the following evaluations.
5.1 Hiding Capacity Analysis
Hiding capacity, also known as the hiding rate, is the amount
that hidden information can be embedded in the carrier signal
per second. The traditional hiding methods hide information
in the form of bits in audio, that is, the unit of hiding capacity
is bit per second (bps). Our proposed method is directly hiding
the information in the form of characters. The information
extracted from the stego audio is a whole sentence, hence
character per second (cps) is used as the unit of hiding capacity
here.
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Figure 4: The PESQ value of stego audios for the proposed
method and the method in [32].
Since the DeepSpeech model divides the audio signal into
50 frames per second when extracting speech features, which
indicates that up to 50 characters can be recognized per sec-
ond. Thus, the theoretical maximum capacity of this informa-
tion hiding method is 50 cps. We conduct a hiding capacity
test on the ten groups. The information for capacity analy-
sis hidden for the audio signal per second is 10 consecutive
"hide", separated by blanks. The experimental results are
shown in Table 2, and the average hiding capacity is 48.0
cps. In the meantime, the hiding capacity of method in [32]
is a fixed value of 84 bps. As 1 character equals to 8 bits, the
capacity of [32] is 10.5 cps. Therefore, our proposed method
has a higher hiding capacity.
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Table 2: The hiding capacity of stego audios
Proposed Method Method in [32]
Group G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 Avg 84 bps = 10.5 cpsCapacity(cps) 47.9 48.2 48.0 46.6 48.6 48.8 48.8 47.6 46.8 48.6 48.0
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Figure 5: The comparison of waveforms between original and stego audios.
5.2 Imperceptibility Analysis
The evaluation methods of audio imperceptibility can be
classed into subjective evaluation and objective evaluation.
Subjective method evaluates the quality of audio based on hu-
man hearing. It is consistent with people’s perception of audio
quality. However, the shortcomings are time-consuming and
labor-intensive, lack of flexibility, poor repeatability and sta-
bility. Objective evaluation utilizes machine to discriminate
audio quality automatically. It gives audio quality evaluation
results in a convenient and fast way without subjective influ-
ence. In this paper, perceptual evaluation of speech quality
(PESQ) is used to perform imperceptible analysis of audio
signals. PESQ is an objective mean opinion score (MOS)
value evaluation method provided by ITU-T Recommenda-
tion P.862, which uses the stego audio to compare with the
original audio. In general, the score is between 1.0 and 4.5.
The worse the speech quality, the lower the score.
In order to evaluate the imperceptibility of the proposed
method, we select a recently proposed audio information hid-
ing method [32] for comparison. 100 stego audios are gener-
ated using the two embedding methods with the hidden text
in Table 1. The tested PESQ value results are shown in Fig. 4,
the average PESQ value of our proposed method is 3.598,
while the method in [32] is 2.351.
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Table 3: The extracted text and extraction success rate of different ASR models
Group
Model Internal Security Model External Security
DeepSpeech
v0.1.0
DeepSpeech
v0.2.0 Google Cloud IBM Watson iFlytek
G1 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G2 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G3 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G4 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G5 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G6 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G7 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G8 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G9 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
G10 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Average Success Rate 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
The audio with the lowest PESQ value is selected to ana-
lyze the waveform of the audio signals. The waveforms are
shown in Fig. 5. In general, the smaller the difference between
original audio and stego audio, the larger the PESQ value, that
is, the imperceptibility is better. Fig. 5 (a) is the waveform of
original audio and Fig. 5 (b) is the waveform of stego audio.
In order to find the difference between the two waveforms
more intuitively, we combine the two into Fig. 5 (c). It can be
found that the two audios are basically overlapped completely
and have no difference. Thus, a small part, which is the black
box in Fig. 5 (c), is enlarged for more detailed observation in
Fig. 5 (d). By observing the Fig. 5 (d), even if enlarged 30
times, the difference between them is still small, which means
that our method has good imperceptibility.
5.3 Security Analysis
The security of audio information hiding refers to the ability
that the hidden information cannot be extracted by the attacker.
In this paper, the original model (DeepSpeech v0.1.0) is used
as the private model.
5.3.1 Model Internal Security Analysis
As the private model acts like the key in traditional hiding
methods, the key space security should be evaluated, which
is defined as model internal security in our proposed method.
The model internal security analysis is to find out if the model
will output the same result while the weights of model are dif-
ferent. We evaluate the security by comparing the extraction
success rate from the private model to its upgraded version
model DeepSpeech v0.2.0. The two DNN models have dif-
ferent neuron weights while holding the same neural network
structure. The extracting results are shown in Table 3.
5.3.2 Model External Security Analysis
The model external security analysis is to find out if the
model will output the same result while the whole model
structure and parameters are different. We evaluate the model
external security by comparing the extraction success rate
from the private model to other ASR models. Three public
commercialized ASR platform services Google Cloud [10],
IBM Watson [16] and iFlytek [17] Speech-to-Text are
selected to extract the hidden information in different groups.
The extraction success rates are shown in Table 3.
From the above results, it can be seen that only the private
model can extract the hidden information. Even the same
model cannot extract hidden information after the model pa-
rameters are updated (i.e., DeepSpeech v0.2.0). In addition,
according to the specific extraction information during the
experiment, only the information related to the original audio
can be obtained for public models. Any content related to the
hidden text cannot be obtained at all. Therefore, the security
of this audio information hiding method is high.
5.4 Robustness Analysis
The robustness of audio information hiding refers to the ability
of the stego audio to remain hidden text that can be completely
extracted after suffering some modification or transformation.
In order to test the robustness of the algorithm, the above 10
stego audio groups are processed as follows:
1. Add Gaussian white noise. A Gaussian white noise with
a signal-noise ratio (SNR) of 20 dB is added to the stego
audio signals;
2. Resampling attack. Up-sampling the stego audio signals.
Up-sampling: First, the stego audio signal is resampled
by 2 times the original sampling rate, and then restored
to the original sampling rate;
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Table 4: The extraction success rate after 4 signal processing methods
Group White Gaussian Noise Resampling Lowpass Filtering Echo Interference
G1 0% 50% 0% 0%
G2 0% 30% 0% 0%
G3 0% 70% 0% 0%
G4 0% 70% 0% 0%
G5 0% 50% 0% 0%
G6 0% 60% 0% 0%
G7 0% 20% 10% 10%
G8 0% 60% 0% 0%
G9 0% 40% 0% 0%
G10 0% 10% 0% 0%
Average Success Rate 0% 46% 1% 1%
3. Low-pass filtering: The Butterworth low-pass filter with
a 2-order cutoff frequency of 6 kHz is processed for
stego audio signals;
4. Echo interference: Add an echo with a 50% attenuation
rate and a delay of 30ms in the stego audio signals.
As shown in Table 4, except the resampling attack, the
stego audio signals have lost the hidden text after being pro-
cessed by these methods. The experimental results show that
the robustness of our proposed hiding technique is not good.
Therefore, in order to enable the receiving end to extract the
hidden text successfully, the stego audio signals can only be
transmitted in a lossless propagation, for example, to upload
the audio file.
5.5 Steganalysis
Steganalysis is a technique against information hiding for
detecting whether there is hidden information in data. Ac-
cording to the relationship between feature extraction and
embedding algorithm, it can be classed into two steganal-
ysis technologies, which are called as special steganalysis
and general steganalysis technique, respectively. The special
steganalysis generally targets a certain type of information
hiding method. According to the statistical analysis of the
data, it uses the difference between the statistical features to
design the corresponding steganalysis algorithm. The general
steganalysis generally aims at multiple types of hiding meth-
ods, which is more universal and has more practical value. It
extracts some features of the data to form a feature vector set,
which is then trained by neural network, clustering algorithm
or other methods to construct a detection model to analyze
the hidden information.
In this paper, we use a recently proposed general steganaly-
sis method that takes the quantified modified DCT (QMDCT)
coefficients matrix as the input of a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) [31] to analyze if the audio signal have been
embedded hidden information. The CNN model is trained
with the default configuration and dataset in [31]. Then the
200 original and stego audios are analyzed by the model. The
results show that 100% stego audios can be recognized as
being embedded hidden information. However, 80% original
audios are misidentified as well, which means the results can
not be trusted. Therefore, the current mainstream audio ste-
ganalysis algorithm is not accurate enough for our proposed
DNN-based audio information hiding method.
6 DNN-intrinsic Backdoor
This paper proposes a new audio information hidden tech-
nique, which also can be used to activate an intrinsic backdoor
of DNN-based ASR models.
The intelligent speakers, which are the core part of the in-
telligent home control system market, have been developed
rapidly. In the meanwhile, as the most basic component of
intelligent speakers, automatic speech recognition (ASR) ser-
vice is widely integrated into them like Amazon Echo [2],
Google Home [11], Xiaomi AI speaker [34], and Tmall Ge-
nie [1], etc.
When deploying an information hiding technique on IoT
devices like intelligent speakers, the overheads should be
considered because of the limited resources such as CPU,
memory, and battery power.
Fig. 6 shows the whole process of traditional information
hiding methods. In the extracting process, the encrypted infor-
mation of the stego audio needs to be decrypted after being
extracted. However, classic cryptographic security solutions
incur expensive overheads, which is unacceptable on resource-
constrained IoT devices. On the contrary, as shown in Fig. 3,
the information hiding method we propose does not need the
decryption unit and key storage. The hidden information can
be obtained by simply inputting the stego audio into the ASR
model to recognize, which means the overhead is negligible.
Thus it can be an appropriate solution for audio information
hiding in resource-constrained IoT devices like intelligent
speakers.
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Figure 6: The embedding and extracting process of traditional information hiding methods.
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Figure 7: The recognition process of the DNN-based intel-
ligent speaker. The blue lines indicate the process of recog-
nizing a normal audio. The red lines indicate the process of
activating the intrinsic backdoor of ASR model by recogniz-
ing the stego audio.
However, the hidden information can be illegally used by at-
tackers to activate a backdoor of the DNN-based ASR model.
Fig. 7 shows an example of the recognition process of the
intelligent speaker. As shown in Fig. 7, the intelligent speaker,
which embeds with a DNN-based ASR model, can recognize
the normal audio as a normal sentence like the process indi-
cated by the blue lines in the figure. However, when a stego
audio with the hidden information of activation instruction
is sent to the intelligent speaker, it will be recognized as a
command to activate the backdoor of DNN model like the
process indicated by the red lines. Later on, once the backdoor
of the intelligent speaker is activated, attackers can obtain the
control of all intelligent IoT devices in your home. For ex-
ample, open the door, query the position of children’s watch,
and control curtain, air conditioner, TV, etc. At the same time,
your personal privacy information may be leaked through
these devices, which can be used to carry out illegal activities
or cause damage to your property.
7 Conclusions
The paper proposes a novel technique for audio information
hiding based on adversarial examples, which takes the origi-
nal audio signal as input and obtains the stego audio through
the training process of the private ASR model. According to
experimental results, the generated stego audio signal has a
hiding capacity of 48.0 cps with good imperceptibility, which
is difficult for the human ear to perceive the difference be-
tween the original audio signal and the stego audio signal.
Besides, The hidden text in stego audio signal can only be
extracted by the private ASR model. Without knowing the
internal parameters and structure of the private model, the
public model can only extract the original text. Therefore, the
security of our proposed audio information hiding method
is high. In addition, our proposed adversarial audio brings
serious threats to DNN-based ASR models.
However, our proposed new audio information hiding tech-
nique is not robust enough. At current stage, the stego audio
signals can only be transmitted in a lossless propagation. We
expect to provide a new solution for audio information hiding,
and gradually address the shortcoming in further research.
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